Denver Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 4

Article 7

January 1930

Colorado Supreme Court Decisions
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Colorado Supreme Court Decisions, 7 Dicta 32 (1930).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EorroR's No'r-It is intended in each issue of DicrA to print brief abstracts of
the decisions of the Supreme Court These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

CORPORATIONS -

DIRECTORS -

PREFERRED

CREDITORS--SUC-

11998-Beaver Park Co. vs. Hobson-Decided December 2, 1929.
Facts.-Beaver Park Co. was organized to take over a
former land company and an irrigation company, after the
Pueblo flood had destroyed the irrigation system and the companies were without funds to proceed. Penrose, a director,
loaned money to the company to perform the work, after the
company had tried to raise money without success. Certain
land owners had brought suit and obtained judgments against
the former water company for damages and sought to hold
the new company as successor of the old company and to have
their judgments declared superior liens to that of Penrose for
moneys he advanced and for which he took security from the
company.
Held.-An officer of a corporation, in the absence of bad
faith or fraud, has the same right to become its creditor, preferred or otherwise, as one who has no official connection
therewith. The Beaver Park Company was not a continuation of, or reincarnation of, the old company and there being
a consideration for the transfer of the assets from the old company to the new and no fraud nor merger nor consolidation,
the new company cannot be held for the debts of the old company.
Judgment Reversed.
CESSORS--No.
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INTEREST -

No.

12154-Toll vs. Colorado National Bank, et al-Decided
December 23, 1929.
Facts.-The Twin, Lakes Land and Water Company executed a deed of trust to which were attached interest coupons
paying 6 per cent. interest. At the same time they executed a
series of 1 per cent interest coupons which were not attached

DICTA

to the principal note. The original note and deed of trust
with the coupons attached became the property of the Colorado National Bank and the 1 per cent interest coupons which
were detached came into the possession of Toll as trustee.
Held.-First,in the absence of an agreement or a special
equity to the contrary, assignees holding separately several
notes secured by a mortgage or otherwise are entitled to share
pro rata and without any preference in the proceeds arising
from the sale of the securities, when insufficient to satisfy them
all, and this is true if all the notes matured on different dates,
and the assignments were made at different times. Second,
Toll was not entitled to pro rate to the extent of his interest
coupons that had not yet matured.
Judgment Affirmed and Modified.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS -

AUTOMOBILES-FORFEITURE-NO.

12199-Lindsley vs. Werner-Decided December 23, 1929.
Facts.-Lindsley sold an automobile to Walling. The
purchaser did not pay the entire purchase price, but gave back
a mortgage. The mortgage contained a covenant against the
use of the car in violation of the Federal or State intoxicating
liquor laws. Thereafter, while the car contained intoxicating liquors, an officer seized the same and was proceeding to
forfeit the car under the intoxicating liquor statutes, and the
mortgagee, who was innocent in the transaction, instituted suit
in replevin against the officer.
Held.-While the automobile is used or kept for the purpose of violating the provisions of the intoxicating liquor act,
it can be forfeited to the State, notwithstanding that there is
a chattel mortgage against it and the mortgagee was innocent
and had no knowledge of the use to which the car was being
put.*
Judgment Affirmed.
MECHANICS' LIENS-CONTRACTORS' BONDS-SUBROGATION-

11906-Howard vs. Fisher-DecidedDecember 9, 1929.
Facts.-Howard owned five lots which she mortgaged to
The Colorado Mortgage Company. Thereafter she hired
ESTOPPEL-NO.

*EDITOR'S QUAERE: Would this be true if the mortgagee was not a party to the
action and was never notified of the seizure?

DICTA

Brendle and Brent to build an apartment house on them, and
they gave a contractors' bond with The National Surety Company as surety. Brendle and Brent defaulted and the Surety
Company undertook the work, which it continued for a time,
then dropped. It paid certain mechanics' lien claimants and
assignments of their liens were taken in the name of Smith,
the Surety Company's Vice-President. After work had been
begun the Midland Company paid off the Mortgage Company's loan and took a new mortgage; after suit had been
started one Auslender bought Howard's interest in the property, but the trial Court refused to make Auslender a party.
Held.-The Surety Company was estopped to assert the
claims under the assignments of the mechanic's lien. The
Midland Company's loan is inferior to the mechanic's lien
claims, but it is entitled to the protection of the contractor's
bond. Auslender should have been made a party to the proceedings.
Judgment Affirmed in Partand Reviyed in Part.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-ORDINANCE-FORTUNE

TELLERS

-No. 12496-Watson vs. City of Denver-Decided December 23, 1929.
Facts.-Watson was charged with the violation of section 1202 of the Municipal Code of Denver, was found guilty
and was fined. She appealed to the County Court where she
was again found guilty and fined apparently on the theory that
she was a fortune teller without having procured a license.
The complaint against her was that she violated Section 1202.
Section 1202 defined fortune tellers and clairvoyants but contained no penalty.
Held.-Section 1202 of the Municipal Code creates no
offense. The complaint states no offense. The verdict found
Helen Watson guilty of no offense. Hence the judgment
cannot stand.
Judgment Reversed.
1226--Kochiovelos vs.
Kochiovelos Live Stock Co. et al.-Decided December 16,
1929.
Facts.-This was a suit by one brother against another

RECEIVERSHIP-LACK OF PROOF-No.
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and a company seeking the appointment of a receiver of the
corporate property, a dissolution of the corporation, a disposition of the assets of the company and for an accounting.
Judgment below was rendered for the defendant.
Held.-The evidence failed to sustain the plaintiff's allegations for receivership and accounting.
Judgment Affirmed.
No. 12260 - Kritzmanich vs. Spehar, Administrator-DecidedDecember 16,
1929.
Facts.-The administrator brought an action in replevin
in the District Court to recover certain cattle, horses, and miscellaneous farm equipment. Defendants were the two eldest
of five sons of the deceased. The sole issue involved was
whether the personal property was owned by the deceased at
the time of his death, or by the defendants. There was conflicting evidence, and the trial court entered judgment for
possession for the plaintiff.
Held.-On the question of possession or ownership, the
evidence was conflicting, and there was sufficient, proper, substantial, and credible evidence from which the Court had the
right to determine that the property involved in this suit was
all owned by the deceased. Judgment of the trial court based
upon such evidence will not be disturbed by this court.
Judgment Affirmed.
REPLEVIN -

CONFLICTING EVIDENCE -

12446-In
re Last Will of Schmidt, Deceased, et al. vs. DillinghamDecided December 16, 1929.
Facts.-A beneficiary under the will sought to have it
admitted to probate. Dillingham contested its provisions.
Proponent demurred and the Court sustained the demurrer.
Contestant elected to stand and appealed to the Supreme
Court, which reversed the case, with directions to overrule
the demurrer. The case went back, the trial court overruled
the demurrer, and on motion, later struck out the answer on
the ground that the matters set forth in the answer had been
fully adjudicated by the Supreme Court in the former appeal.
WILLS-CONTEST-FORMER ADJUDICATION-No.

DICTA

Held.-For the lower Court to strike an answer without
giving an opportunity to amend was a drastic action; but in
this particular case, the answer consisted of a repetition of
pleas formerly made and already adjudicated, and under such
circumstances the Court did not err in adopting such drastic
action.
Judgment Affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CASUAL EMPLOYEES-NOTICE

12320-Comerford vs. Carr et al.-Decided January 6, 1930.
Facts.-Comerford, the employer, was engaged in a rendering business and Carr the employee, testified that he was
hurt while working for Comerford, that he ran a stone into
his hand and was poisoned. The employer at different times
had more than four employees working for him but they were
not doing the same work, as Carr the injured employee was
engaged in loading cars. Carr was awarded compensation.
Held.-( 1) Carr was not required to file notice claiming
compensation because he was paid compensation during the
time he was off work. (2) He was injured in the course of his
employment. (3) Comerford had more than four employees
working for him. (4) The other employees were not casual
employees because they were employed in the usual course of
trade of the employer. (5) These other employees were engaged in a common employment. The mere fact that they
were engaged in loading the cars was not a different employment. This was necessary for the conduct of the employer's
business.
Judgment Affirmed.
OF CLAIM-No.

